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Worldviews of Aspiring Powers Review, Meredith Oyen

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Reviewed by Meredith Oyen (University of Maryland Baltimore County)
Published on H-Diplo (April, 2013)
Commissioned by Seth Offenbach 

Cover_LargeThe impact of domestic politics on foreign policy is a subject of long-standing interest for both historians of American foreign relations and political scientists concerned with international relations. A new volume edited by Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally, Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia, brings together prominent scholars from across the world to explore the domestic dimension of foreign policy in five important countries. The core argument of this book is that domestic debates powerfully affect foreign policy, sometimes exerting as much influence as external factors. The authors consider the implications of the contesting worldviews not only for each country’s foreign policy, but also for U.S. foreign policy responses. Worldviews of Aspiring Powers therefore offers both a model for future studies of domestic debates in other rising or aspiring powers as well as some thoughtful advice for policymakers.

In order to develop a common vocabulary for discussing and analyzing these debates across the countries under study, Nau’s introductory chapter discusses three aspects of foreign policy under debate everywhere: the scope, means, and goals of policy. By analyzing these three aspects across three broad categories of worldviews–national, regional, and global–he sets up a broad framework of twenty-seven possible worldviews, which the authors of the individual chapter then use as a guide to explore the unique variations of the country under their consideration. Nau makes clear from the outset that reality does not fit the generalized model perfectly, and each country under consideration possesses attributes that make it unique. 

The book’s title makes clear the rationale for selecting these five countries: they are all, in their own ways, “aspiring” to a position in the world they do not yet hold. Not all of them, however, are at comparable stages of development. Japan has risen, though its status as a regional military power is limited; China, India, and Russia are often viewed as rising powers, though each is in some sense “conflicted” about its status; Iran is a potential power, and perhaps the greatest embodiment of the idea of “aspiring.” Though all in a sense “aspiring,” the inclusion of these five governments of “Greater Asia” to the exclusion of others could use further explanation, even if that explanation is simply the limitations of time, travel, and scholarly contacts. That said, the editors themselves acknowledge the need to expand the study, and Deepa M. Ollapally’s conclusion begins to address how to apply their model to Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey.

Each of the five individual country studies consists of a single chapter that combines the research of a U.S.-based specialist with a specialist in the country under consideration. Together, they offer a model for how to think about each country’s foreign policy concerns and debates, as well as explaining where the opinions are coming from and why. International Relations (IR) theorists might find the model itself, as well as the conclusion that in all five countries a realist model dominates, to be the most striking result of the study. For historians interested in the foreign relations and policy choices of the individual countries, the chapters on the internal debates may prove quite useful in unpacking the patterns of debate and schools of thought as they’ve changed over time.

In the opening chapter on China, David Shambaugh and Ren Xiao examine the opinions of scholars of international relations and their publications, as well as public statements from officials and state-sponsored research institutes to reveal a “spectrum” of seven foreign policy worldviews. These range from the insular to the very internationally oriented (p. 49). The contradictions among these views lead the authors to conclude that China is a conflicted power, uncertain in its own identity, and this necessarily makes clear policy prescriptions for the United States difficult to formulate. The authors acknowledge the difficulty of parsing public opinion on foreign policy issues, from the nationalist rhetoric of Chinese “netizens” to the more critical assertions of dissidents, and therefore opt not to include these perspectives in their study.

In India, the main challenge in identifying domestic foreign policy debates is determining whose opinions really matter. Deepa M. Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan focus on the opinions that seem to matter most, those within the government, with two caveats. The first is that personality is unusually important as a determining factor in India. The second caveat is that public opinion, when it matters, acts as a constraint or “veto” on issues of popular importance such as international nonproliferation policy (p. 75). Instead of a spectrum, Ollapally and Rajagopalan identify seven interlocking schools of thought, with a “standard nationalism” rooted in Jawaharlal Nehru and present since India’s founding at the center. This central idea, they suggest, has faced increasing competition from more globally oriented ideas that have gained popularity since the end of the Cold War. Despite the existence of much common ground between these schools of thought, policy toward the United States is, the authors suggest, the major point of dispute; they believe “all other differences in perspective are subsumed under this key issue” (p. 101). This point alone underscores the need for American policymakers to gain a better understanding of the debate in New Delhi.

The chapters on China and India both note the opaque nature of some foreign policy debates and the subsequent challenges for scholars attempting to dissect them, but Farideh Farhi and Saideh Lotfian had perhaps the most daunting challenge in attempting this analysis in Iran. The authors lack the robust publishing output of IR specialists in China or the media access to government offices in India. Instead, they relied on public speeches, sermons, and a far more limited academic literature in their attempt. These sources helped add nuance to the traditional conception of the Iranian domestic debate as a dichotomy between those emphasizing pragmatic geopolitical interest, and ideology. Farhi and Loftian identify Islamic Idealists, Regional Power Balancers, and Global Power Balancers as core worldviews, and break these groups down further based on their respective policy goals and the means through which they hope to achieve them. The authors highlight the role of a revolutionary Islamic and Iranian nationalism in shaping worldviews at every point along the spectrum, with the debate over how best to achieve security and status as a rising power remaining. The result is a conflicted identity in which advocates at either extreme cannot be completely successful.

In many respects, Japan is the odd man out in this study, with its relative economic prominence and its long-standing alliance with the United States. The internal debate then is less focused on how to balance or confront American actions and more on how to adjust policy strategies to an increasingly multipolar world. Basing their analysis on the work of “scholars, commentators, politicians and bureaucrats,” authors Narushige Michishita and Richard J. Samuels identify four worldviews based on their approach to two issues: the U.S. alliance (a foreign policy goal) and the use of force (a means to achieve it) (p. 151). The resulting perspectives identify broad approaches to Japan’s interaction with the world, which are then subdivided by other factors. They then attempt to remodel the debate, replacing the question of the use of force with Japan’s relationship with China, thereby exploring how Japan’s two most influential bilateral relationships affect its thinking about its foreign policy. The resulting four schools of thought, which range from deep integration to deep isolation, are not equally distributed among the foreign policy elite. The chapter argues that these ideas matter, but it also suggests that Japan’s interactions with other states and changing world events seem to have a greater impact on the Japanese calculus, suggesting the primacy of realist approaches based on hard power.

The final country chapter, which is about Russia, acknowledges the unique history of a once-and-future power enduring the pains of collapse and a changing world. Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor Zevelev look at political parties, experts, and other prominent voices in Russian debates to identify three dominant worldviews: pro-Western liberals, great power balancers, and nationalists (p. 184). Echoing a theme that recurs throughout the volume, namely the way in which national identity and self-perception shape debates, the authors suggest that the Russian sense of itself is greatly influenced by its relationship with the United States, as “old habits of measuring success or failure through a United States-centered prism have endured” (p. 199). The authors cite a smaller range of perspectives than previous chapters, in part because only those who are committed to an expanding role for Russia in the world and who embrace nationalism can be influential in the debate in Moscow.

Across all five chapters, a few general ideas emerge that are worthy of further investigation. The first is that realist worldviews are dominating or rising in each case, suggesting that rhetoric aside, pragmatic approaches are widely favored in translating ideas into actions. A second is that nationalism is vitally important in understanding how these aspiring powers view themselves and their place in the world, though what the term “nationalism” means and how it translates to foreign policy varies widely across both time and borders. A related theme is the extent to which the national mythology, or the self-perception of what the country’s place in the world is or should be, significantly influences foreign policy worldviews in each country: for China, it is the idea of being still a developing country; in India, the legacy of nonalignment and nonviolence learned from Nehru and Gandhi; in Iran, the fear of the “hidden hand” of foreign involvement in its political affairs; in Japan, the importance of the U.S. alliance; and in Russia, the legacy of superpower status and the inevitable comparison of  all progress against that of the United States. All five chapters ground their discussion in recent history to varying degrees, but historians might be interested in adopting this approach to explore earlier debates in order to analyze a longer trajectory of change.

Worldviews of Aspiring Powers concludes that the use of a standard model originating in Western international relations theory applied to five non-Western countries reveals enough similarities in the spectrum of foreign policy thinking for these comparisons to prove useful. The volume is a provocative step in this direction, though the fact that each chapter necessarily uses a different range of sources to uncover the influential worldviews for that country raises questions about the extent to which they can really be comparable. The “Greater Asia” construct loosely ties these five cases together, but the question remains whether analyzing additional countries at comparable stages of development or that hold similar “aspiring power” status could help to establish whether the similarities revealed so far are superficial or more profound.

Another important question is the extent to which these debates really shape changing policies. Throughout the book, the editors and the chapter authors acknowledge the difficulty of linking specific worldviews to concrete policy outcomes, so although the idea that policies are shaped by these domestic debates is compelling, the direct cause-and-effect relationship is not yet visible. There are steps in this direction in some chapters, but more discussion of the process through which these worldviews reach and influence those actually speaking for each country would be necessary to make the full weight of these debates clearer. Far from undermining the volume, however, this fact suggests that further inquiry into this framework is needed to advance the project, something the editors themselves acknowledge.

The opportunities for additional study are nearly endless, but Worldviews is a valuable addition to a growing literature on the connections between domestic politics and foreign policy. This volume should prove useful to scholars from both international relations and history, in no small part because of the accessible way in which it is written; though use of international relations theories and acronyms abounds, none are likely to be unfamiliar to anyone acquainted with foreign policy debates. Moreover, it could open a path toward further crossover studies, in which historians employ the framework offered here to explore domestic debates at critical historical junctures, and political scientists attempt to apply their analysis to past events.

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Reader’s Choice: The RPI’s Top 5 Policy Alerts

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The RPI recently published its 50th Policy Alert. We’re celebrating by bringing back the top 5 most widely read Policy Alerts. Thank you for your continued readership and support!

  1. Policy Alert #45: Asian Powers Comment on French Intervention in Mali (February 2013)
  2. Policy Alert #48: Lessons from Cyprus: Rising Powers Comment on the Bank Bailout and Financial Globalization (March 2013)
  3. Policy Alert #50: Boston Marathon Bombings Elicit Mixed Reactions from Asian Powers (May 2013)
  4. Policy Alert #33: Sentiments from Asia’s Rising Powers on Winning & losing at the Olympics (July 2012)
  5. Policy Alert #44: Heightened Tensions in the East China Sea: Reactions from China and Japan (January 2013)

Iranian Foreign Policy After the Election: Realists and Islamic Idealists Face Off

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A supporter of Iranian presidential candidate Saeed Jalili holds his picture after a rally in Tehran June 12, 2013. (Yalda Moayeri / Courtesy Reuters)

A supporter of Iranian presidential candidate Saeed Jalili holds his picture after a rally in Tehran June 12, 2013. (Yalda Moayeri / Courtesy Reuters)

In today’s Foreign Affairs, RPI authors Farideh Farhi and Saideh Lotfian analyze Iranian foreign policy after the election using the schools of thought outlined in the RPI’s Worldviews of Aspiring Powers edited volume:

“As Iranians head to the polls today, much of the world is focused on the country’s domestic politics, particularly given the unrest that followed the last presidential election. A question that has gotten less attention is how the choice of president will impact the country’s foreign policy. But in Iran, like in other countries, domestic politics play a big role in foreign policy. The election has exposed the choices available to decision-makers and the political limits they face.

As we wrote in Worldviews of Aspiring Powers, two basic tensions underpin almost all the foreign policy perspectives in Iran. The first tension is between Iran’s outright rejection of the current international order and its desire to improve its own position within that order. The second tension is between the country’s sense of importance as a regional and global player and its impulse to emphasize Iran’s insecurities and strategic loneliness. The one guiding principle of Iranian foreign policy that is in no way up for debate is nationalism, specifically an emphasis on national sovereignty in the face of global arrogance.

These three broad forces shape the boundaries beyond which political players cannot step if they wish to remain relevant. Those seeking improved relations or accommodation with the global order, for example, need to walk a fine line between being seen as promoting the national interest and falling prey to sazesh (collusion). Meanwhile, those advocating resistance to the West and self-sufficiency have to be mindful of the country’s official desire to be the region’s technological and economic leader. And, one way or another, everyone must package their positions in a wrapper of nationalism.

In short, there is near consensus on the broad objectives of Iranian foreign policy: enhance Iran’s role in the Middle East and maintain the country’s Islamic identity despite the adversity of global powers. Where there is room for debate is over the scope of Iran’s foreign policy and the means through which it might achieve these objectives. It would be a mistake to reduce these discussions to a contest between hard-liners and ideologues on the one hand, and those who want accommodation with the West on the other.”

Read the full article here.

Policy Brief: Contending Views on Japan as a Global Power

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Representative Abe speaks at a June 2013 conference on Japan as a Global Power (Source: RPI)

Representative Abe speaks at a June 2013 conference on Japan as a Global Power (Source: RPI)

Japan confronts an ever-changing security environment abroad and economic turmoil at home as it looks to maintain a role as a global power. Japanese and U.S. experts discussed how Tokyo should respond to these challenges at a recent conference that presented a wide array of domestic views in each country on the future of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, Japanese history and society, and domestic policy priorities.

Timothy Westmyer, research and program assistant at the Rising Powers Initiative, and Samuel Porter,
research assistant to Professor Mike Mochizuki, wrote a Policy Brief to illustrate how the contending views from Japan were expressed during this event.

 

 

To read the Policy Brief, click here.

Policy Brief: U.S.-Russia Relations Back from the Brink

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In 2012, the Rising Powers Initiative published an edited volume entitled Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia, edited by Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally. The Worldviews volume identifies the most important domestic schools of thought within each country and connects them to the history and institutional development of each nation. In this Policy Brief, Russia chapter author Andrew Kuchins examines how Russia’s foreign policy has evolved over the past two years from the lens of President Vladimir Putin’s leadership, conflict in the Middle East, and U.S.-Russia relations.

 

Read the full Policy Brief here

RPI Author Deepa Ollapally: “India’s Evolving National Identity Contestation: What Reactions to the ‘Pivot’ Tell Us”

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SF_Deepa-624x410Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and the Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, recently published an article in The ASAN Forum titled “India’s Evolving National Identity Contestation: What Reactions to the ‘Pivot’ Tell Us.”

Despite the massive transformations that have been underway in India’s economic and strategic realms since 1991, this article argues that the changes predicted by the realist theory of international relations have not occurred and are not likely anytime soon. India has posed a difficult case for realists since the country’s independence. Earlier, it bucked the trend of bipolar alliances that were so dominant in the Cold War era; now, it has not engaged in the classic balancing behavior we would have expected over the last decade given its adversary China’s rapid ascent and looming threat in India’s own backyard. I suggest that the missing explanatory variable for India’s puzzling behavior (from a realist perspective) is national identity, something that realist exponents dismiss as epiphenomenon or rationalization.

Although more pragmatic and power-centered contestations are increasingly heard in domestic discourse over foreign policy, what is striking is the persistence of identity- based arguments. Currently, we find challenges to the nationalists from what I term globalists and realists (My focus here is on the latter). However, nationalist identity serves as a constraint on those Indian leaders who want to make a clear break with the past and formulate new policy that reflects a more realist approach: steer the country toward a closer partnership with the United States and develop a more assertive, militarily robust posture vis-a-vis China.

The US pivot or rebalancing of 2011 is a good test case to see how recent Indian thinking is evolving because the new policy (implicitly at any rate) provides an excellent opportunity for India to put into place both of these realist preferences toward the United States and China. My proposition is that India will not seize this opportunity any time soon, not because it does not make strategic sense, but because of the enormous value nationalists place on factors that define Indian national identity: in particular, strategic autonomy and anti-colonial nationalism. Indeed, what this paper more narrowly finds is that the concept of identity gaps (to use Rozman’s term developed for East Asia) is useful to analyze Indian foreign policy toward the United States and China (although I do not focus on China in this paper). But the way the identity gap plays out here tends to go against conventional expectations: a form of identity gap between the United States and India leads to sub-optimal cooperation, and an identity convergence of sorts between China and India leads to higher than expected cooperation. This is not to overstate the relevance of identity gaps per se in these relationships (especially when compared to East Asia), but they are far from irrelevant.

To read the rest of the article, click here.

RPI Author Mike Mochizuki: Bridging Asia’s Historical Divides

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Dr. Mike Mochizuki, Identity and Power in Asia project co-director and associate dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and Brooking’s Michael O’Hanlon recently co-wrote an op-ed in The National Interest on healing Asia’s “wounds of history.” The authors discuss nationalist tendencies by China as well as U.S. allies and suggest actions the United States and countries in Asia can take to seek reconciliation on these tensions. Mochizuki and O’Hanlon stress that the “stability of Northeast Asia in coming years could hang in the balance”:

As President Obama prepares for his trip to Asia in two weeks, tensions are remarkably high in a part of the world that was supposed to be smart enough to focus on getting rich even as the Middle East remained bogged down in conflict. Although much of the problem originates in China, American allies sometimes play a role too—including the government of Shinzo Abe in Japan. His visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo are one big reason. Mr. Obama, like other American officials, will probably ask him to desist from future visits when the two heads of government meet in Tokyo. But in fact, Obama should concentrate on a more realistic agenda—asking Abe to redefine and transform the shrine, rather than stop visiting it.

The wounds of history are profound in East Asia. Simple repetition of the official Japanese apology first articulated by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in August 1995 will not suffice to promote historical reconciliation. And as Abe demonstrated by his visit to Yasukuni in December 2013, Japanese political leaders like their counterparts in other countries naturally feel compelled to honor their country’s war dead. The Yasukuni Shrine memorializes millions of rank-and-file Japanese soldiers who died for their country, not just the fourteen Japanese leaders who were convicted of “Class A” war crimes or who died while on trial for such crimes.

If Prime Minister Abe or his successors want to visit Yasukuni in the future, it should be a transformed shrine. The Yasukuni grounds currently contain a military museum that downplays Japanese aggression and ignores Japan’s war responsibility. An exhibition with such a distorted view of Japan’s past does not belong at a solemn shrine that should be primarily about remembering the sacrifice of ordinary Japanese soldiers. In addition to closing down this military museum, the Yasukuni Shrine should find a creative way to remove the names of the Class A war criminals from among the millions who are memorialized. This option was indeed proposed by a leading political patron of Yasukuni in 2007 and even by then prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone after his controversial visit to the shrine in 1985. When Emperor Hirohito learned of the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals in 1978, he was reportedly so angry that he refused to visit Yasukuni again. If Japanese patriots want to honor their war dead, the best way to do so is to transform Yasukuni so that the Japanese emperor can once again visit the shrine, as was frequently done before 1978, without stirring international controversy.

As contentious as Yasukuni is, this shrine is far from the only issue preventing the healing of historical wounds. Many matters require attention, from the issue of “comfort women,” to the name of the Sea of Japan (which Korean Americans in Virginia are now contesting), to the way Chinese and Koreans teach their own people about the Japanese (verging at times on demonization, despite Japan’s peaceful foreign policy after World War II and its efforts to atone for its militarist past).

Since the late 1990s, scholars from the three nations have engaged in both official and unofficial dialogues and research regarding history. Now is time to deepen and broaden the effort. What matters most, for the future, is how citizens in one country are taught about the other nations. This process begins in school but goes well beyond it.

Scholars and opinion leaders in Japan, China, and Korea should avoid mutual recriminations and work toward a shared history. To encourage this process, Japan can take the lead by dramatically expanding the activities of the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records. This center was established because of a 1994 initiative by Prime Minister Murayama who wanted “to enable everyone to face squarely the facts of history.” In addition to serving as an archive for historical documents, the center should sponsor exchange and dialogue programs among scholars, educators, journalists and youth in all three countries regarding history and memory. The ultimate aim should be to get balanced and historically accurate views into multiple media so that, throughout their lives, current and future Koreans, Chinese and Japanese learn about each other—warts and all, to be sure, but in a way that avoids scapegoating, ethnic divisiveness, and warmongering.

Americans can also foster historical reconciliation, but it should not do so in a sanctimonious manner because the United States too contributed to Northeast Asia’s tragic history. The best way would be for Americans to become a full partner in transnational dialogues about history with Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese and to emphasize that reconciliation is a two-way street and an ongoing long-term process.

Although states and their leaders can and should establish a diplomatic environment conducive for a reconciliation process to take hold, deep-rooted attitudes of these countries’ citizens are, at present, arguably the greatest potential catalysts to conflict. We need to make them work for peace, not against it. The stability of Northeast Asia in coming years could hang in the balance.

Mike Mochizuki is professor and associate dean at the Sigur Center at George Washington University. Michael O’Hanlon is senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

You can read the original article by clicking here.

 

 

 

Announcing the Launch of the Rising Powers Initiative Research Database

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As part of the Rising Powers Initiative’s efforts to analyze and compare the foreign policy thinking in today’s rising powers, we are pleased to announce the launch of the RPI Research Database, a specialized bibliography of books and articles on targeted subjects that reflect the RPI’s ongoing researchEach entry contains an abstract or summary of the article or book. The Database has been compiled by our research staff and is frequently updated with articles and books from 1990 onwards, with emphasis on the latest academic and policy publications.

Countries and regions in the Database include:

  • China
  • India
  • Japan
  • Russia
  • South Korea
  • Southeast Asia and ASEAN
  • Taiwan

Topics and subjects in the Database include:

  • Identity and foreign policy
  • Energy security, maritime security, and Asian security
  • Nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation
  • Regional  political economy
  • U.S. foreign policy in Asia

The Research Database can be accessed here. We hope that this interactive Database is a useful tool for conducting research on rising powers in Asia and for keeping up to date on the latest relevant academic and policy publications. We encourage you to share the Database as a resource with your colleagues, and welcome your feedback and suggestions.


Deepa Ollapally’s Op Ed on Modi’s Worldview–One Country at a Time

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nmodiRPI author Deepa Ollapally discusses Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s worldview in the wake of U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to India. This op-ed originally appeared in the Indian Express.

In the wake of US President Barack Obama’s visit to India, there has been no dearth of pronouncements about Narendra Modi, with the prime minister variously described as a problem-solver, a strategic thinker, a public relations master. Behind these appellations, however, lies a deeper question: what is Modi’s worldview? The series of high-profile summits with the Japanese, Chinese and American leaders in fairly rapid succession, and now Modi’s proposed visit to China in May, give us a better idea of his foreign policy worldview — one country at a time. Even the optics of these meetings is giving us markers of Modi’s thinking.

Modi’s own worldview has not been easy to read — his postures and policies have not gone according to the hard nationalist script that many expected, given his base. For hard nationalists, their main foreign policy goal would be to make India a global military power. Economic strength is important, but secondary; power is paramount, and diplomacy is just a weak appendage to power.

Modi, however, started off with a bold diplomatic gesture of issuing an unprecedented invitation to neighbouring leaders for his inauguration. Since then, whether it is pouring tea under a shamiyana for the American president, sitting and chatting on a traditional Indian swing in Ahmedabad with the Chinese president, or strolling the grounds of the famous Toji Buddhist Temple in Kyoto with the Japanese prime minister, it is hard to miss the diplomatic disarming.

Besides the appealing optics, leading with diplomacy is smart foreign policy. This is especially true now because of two big structural shifts in the international system that requires subtle diplomacy over crude power-mongering. The first change is a diffusion of global power economically and institutionally, especially to Asia’s rising powers, China and India. The system has basically become more decentralised. What this does is give a country like India greater options and leverage to pursue its strategic interests. The second shift is the growing hybrid nature of the global system, that is, simultaneous economic interdependence and geopolitical rivalry. This is best illustrated by US-China relations but also India-China relations. The point is that India is operating in a complex and dynamic international environment, calling on state leaders to engage in some very delicate balancing acts and hedging behaviour.

For all the talk of India as a traditional great power, a close reading of Modi’s policy towards China, Japan and the US so far suggests that economic growth and development remain at the top of the agenda. During Xi Jinping’s visit to India last September, the Indian prime minister secured a $20 billion promise of investments over five years, even against the startling backdrop of Chinese incursion into the Ladakh region. From Shinzo Abe, Modi had already procured a commitment of $36 billion over five years. President Obama’s pledge of $4 billion over two years cannot be measured in just this amount, since more American private capital and technology may be forthcoming. But this snapshot indicates why India has to follow a careful multi-aligned foreign policy.

Although Obama’s visit produced the landmark document, the US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, whether it was transformational in India’s orientations is very much an open question. India has its own concerns about freedom of navigation in light of China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, but the document is no plan of action. Instead, it gives greater heft to a strategy of hedging by India against China or a stronger insurance policy. It also signals explicitly that, for Modi, the US is clearly first among equals.

Geopolitical signalling aside, it is economic compulsions that weigh most heavily on India. Modi reportedly spent time explaining to Obama that India will continue to strongly engage with China on economic and global issues. Indeed, the president had hardly left New Delhi before it was announced that the Indian foreign minister would visit China within the week. Meanwhile, the border stand-off in September only seems to have underlined the need to come to an early diplomatic resolution of the India-China border dispute. While in India, Xi became the first Chinese leader to say that he wanted to resolve the border question “at an early date”, something Modi and every Indian prime minister before had been pushing for.

For Modi’s part, just days after the stand-off, he addressed the annual Combined Commanders Conference and said that an atmosphere of peace and security was essential to enable India to achieve its goals of economic development.

Achieving developed country status can, of course, be a nationalist goal. But only what might be termed a more globalist mindset privileging regional and global economic integration, with a diplomatic approach for settling security conflicts, will get India there. This could explain why Modi’s worldview does not — and even more importantly, cannot — fit a hard nationalist outlook.

RPI Research Database: A Valuable Tool for Scholars and Policymakers

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The Rising Powers Initiative (RPI) at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies is pleased to offer the RPI Research Database.

RPI is a multi-year, cross-national research effort that examines the role of domestic identities and foreign policy debates of aspiring powers in Asia and Eurasia. As part of our efforts to analyze and compare the foreign policy thinking in today’s rising powers, the Research Database is an edited bibliography of books and articles on targeted subjects that reflect our ongoing research.

Each entry contains an abstract or summary along with further information on how to access the resource. The database is compiled by our research staff and is frequently updated with articles and books from 1990 onwards with emphasis on the latest academic and policy publications.

Countries and regions included in the database:
  • China
  • India
  • Japan
  • Russia
  • South Korea
  • Southeast Asia and ASEAN
  • Taiwan
Topics and subjects included in the database:
  • Identity and foreign policy
  • Energy security, Asian security, and maritime security
  • Nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation
  • International political economy
  • U.S. foreign policy in Asia

The Research Database can be accessed here.

We hope that the Database is a useful tool for conducting research on rising powers in Asia and for keeping up to date on the latest relevant academic and policy publications.



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